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MUST WOLTERSTORFF SELL HIS HOUSE?
David B, Fletcher

In his recent book, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff claims that
in ethics there exist "sustenance rights," also called "positive rights," which demand that
people be provided the requirements of productive social living, including food, clothing,
shelter, healthful environments, and elementary health care. I defend Wolterstorff's claims
against attacks by social theologian Richard John Neuhaus, who argues in effect that to
grant sustenance rights implies both personal and theoretical acceptance of an unreasonable
obligation which I call the Duty of Sacrifice (DOS) to transfer all one's wealth to meet
those needs, a charge which Wolterstorff interprets as a demand that he sell his house.

In his recent work, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, 1 Calvin College philosopher
Nicholas Wolterstorff explores a variety of issues, including Church social teaching, contemporary global economics and power politics, liberation theology in
comparison to Dutch neo-calvinism, epistemology, God's relation to time, and
liturgical renewal, among many other topics. I would like here to restrict my
remarks to an important and controversial claim that he makes about rights,
which has been attacked in a severely critical review article in the journal This
World by Lutheran clergyman and social theologian Richard John Neuhaus 2 and
defended by Wolterstorff in a lively response to this review published in the
Reformed Journal.'
While Neuhaus and Wolterstorff, and other thinkers whom they represent,
disagree fundamentally in their understanding of what constitutes a just society
and the Christian's role therein, the particular aspect of their disagreement that
I would like to examine is Wolterstorff's assertion and Neuhaus's denial of the
claim that within morality there exist "sustenance rights," also called positive
rights by many theorists, along with the less controversial noninterference, or
negative rights.
Wolterstorff argues that we have at least four kinds of rights: rights to protection, from assault for example; rights to freedom, as to free speech; rights to
participate in the political proc~ss; and rights to sustenance,4 This latter right to
sustenance represents, in Wolterstorff's words, "a claim on our fellow human
beings to social arrangements that ensure that we will be adequately sustained
in existence,"5 Wolterstorff includes among the goods we are authorized to claim
under these rights the following: "food, clothing and shelter that are adequate
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for sustaining health and making it possible to contribute to society; ... water and
air that are not injurious to health, and ... elementary health care."6 In a just
society, the provision of such needs at this minimal level for everyone will be
vi(wed as a matter of respect for basic human rights. Wolterstorff considers the
en1itlement to the necessities of adequate sustenance "among the minimal claims
that all of us make on our fellow human beings."
Jf this assertion of sustenance rights is to be more than a mere manifesto, we
must be able to specify the sorts of claims that people are entitled to make under
these sustenance rights. Such rights share certain characteristics with rights in
general. According to Wolterstorff, a right is "(1) ... a morally legitimate claim
that (2) the actual enjoyment of that good (3) be socially guaranteed against
ordinary, serious, and remediable threats. "7 For Wolterstorff, and for Henry Shue
whose book Basic Rights inspires much of his account, a right places real and
substantive obligations on others of three kinds: "(1) duties to avoid depriving
people of the good in question, (2) duties to help protect them from deprivation,
and (3) duties to aid the deprived in the event that deprivation does occur. "R
FulJy satisfying the moral claims that rights impose on others requires more than
merely refraining from engaging in acts which would constitute violations.
Wolterstorff stresses that to refer to a claim upon a good as a "right" is to
imply that the claimant is entitled to the good itself, not merely to a promise or
a legal proclamation that affirms one's right to the good. That point can be
summarized by saying that any genuine right is a "right to a good," not a "right
to a right." Further, and this is important to his account and to my defense of
it, to maintain that someone has a right to a good demands that a social guarantee
be constructed for the right. A right not to be beaten, injured, raped, or killed
place the burden on the social institutions in which the rightholder finds herself
to take steps to see to it that she is not beaten, injured, raped, or killed.
So, Wolterstorff adds rights to the basic necessities for human life and action
in the world to the less controversial rights to noninterference. Now what is
there to object to in all of this, which bears, after all, the pedigree of such a
document as the "United Nations Declaration of Human Rights?" The doctrine
of sustenance rights is philosophically controversial for reasons we shall investigatt.!, but it is nonetheless surprising to hear Neuhaus refer to Wolterstorff's
advocacy of them as a "moral laceration" which is "cruel, but unfortunately not
unusual, punishment for ... all of US."9
What is at issue between the two? Wolterstorff has said that the refusal of "a
rich man" to provide sustenance for a person who is starving "violates the starving
person's rights as surely and reprehensibly as if he had physically assaulted the
sufferer," a conclusion which he expects to make us all "uncomfortable."10 In
his response, Neuhaus seems to ignore that Wolterstorff had included all of us
among the uneasy rich who fall under the obligation; he had claimed that all of
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us are rich in "global terms. "11 Neuhaus then concludes that to accept this doctrine
of sustenance rights is to commit ourselves to the obligation to use our "power
to transfer. .. our personal wealth to starving people-all of it and right now,"
which presumably a sincere Wolterstorff would already have done.'2
For the purpose of discussion, I would like to construe Neuhaus's concerns
as an argument, and then evaluate this Neuhausian argument vis-a-vis Wolterstorff's case for sustenance rights. I will not attempt the entire, formidable
effort of giving a complete proof for such rights, but I hope to show that
sustenance rights follow from the justifications generally offered for rights in
general. Secondly, I suggest that the objections raised to sustenance rights in
particular are not convincing.
To begin then, let us call this duty which Neuhaus regards as correlative to
sustenance rights the Duty of Sacrifice, or DOS. The DOS, which requires us
immediately to give all of our personal wealth to those whose sustenance rights
are not being satisfied, is obviously unreasonable as a demand of moral duty,
failure at which is to constitute an injustice. Sacrifice perhaps more readily falls
into that category often called the supererogatory. So, for any person to fail to
meet the DOS cannot be plausibly interpreted as to violate others' rights. Thus,
the sustenance rights to which the DOS corresponds must be rejected. In his
response to the criticisms in Neuhaus's review, Wolterstorff plausibly interprets
Neuhaus as having subjected Wolterstorff to "ridicule for not having sold [his]
house in Grand Rapids and sent the money to the starving of the world,"'3 an
omission to which Wolterstorff readily admits.
Neuhaus can be interpreted as having set up a dilemma: either we accept the
DOS, obligating us to give all of our resources to fulfill the sustenance rights
of others, or we must reject that there are sustenance rights at all. Since Wolterstorff has evidently not accepted the DOS in his personal life, he must either
tackle the one hom of the dilemma and rectify this situation immediately or else
be impaled on the other hom and forfeit his doctrine of sustenance rights. The
question of our title greets us: must Wolterstorff sell his house?
The resolution of this question leads us to examine the dilemma I am attributing
to Neuhaus. Is there reason to accept it? Well, Neuhaus is in fact in good
philosophical company in rejecting sustenance rights for reasons related to those
we have attributed to him. A right is thought of as being either negative or
positive. If it is negative, it is in Tom Beauchamp's words "a right to hold a
belief, to pursue a course of action, or to enjoy a state of affairs without interference," while if it is positive, it is a right "to obtain a good, opportunity, or
service."'4 Jan Narveson sees negative rights to imply correlative duties "not to
prevent, or interfere with," that to which we are said to have the right, and
distinguishes negative and positive rights as the difference between "the right to
nonhindrance and the right to help."15 For many philosophers, noninterference
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or negative rights are relatively uncontroversial, because they safeguard important
values at low cost, requiring only that other agents refrain from interference;
while sustenance rights demand positive action and thereby encounter theoretical
difficulties.
Joel Feinberg argues that although negative rights are genuine, "positive rights"
are not, strictly speaking, rights at all, because of the following distinction.
Although negative rights impose upon me "duties towards hundreds of millions
of people," they being negative, are such that "1 can discharge them all at a
stroke by minding my own business."16 Positive rights like those to sustenance
are' different. These rights require that actions be taken to insure that they be
fulfilled, and to effectively fulfill them requires more than can reasonably be
expected. Feinberg argues that while "young orphans may need good upbringings,
balanced diets, education, and technical training everywhere in the world," he
would not admit them a right to these goods because the scarcity of the goods
in question makes it "impossible to provision all who need them. "17
Feinberg's notion of correlativity of rights and duties implies that there can
be no right without a corresponding duty that it is reasonable to expect to see
fulfilled, and there now can be no duty that it is at present impossible to fulfill.
Duties arise, along with their corresponding rights, when we find ourselves in
a position to perform them.
I believe Feinberg to be incorrect in his insistence that sustenance rights pose
for us duties too stringent to be performed. To take the "high road" response,
so to speak, we could quite well satisfy those corresponding duties if we were
to accept the DOS. If we were to sell all of our goods, it would be possible to
meet the requirements of the duty that corresponds to the right to sustenance as
held by the needy. To take the less strenuous path, I will argue below that the
duties imposed by sustenance rights are indeed in our power to fulfill with much
more modest sacrifices.
It is not that Feinberg is in any way indifferent to the needy, however. I should
mention that he is willing to grant a "special 'manifesto' sense of right" by which
natural needs can be seen as potential rights, rights becoming actualized when
someone comes into position to grant them. 18 Similarly, Beauchamp argues that
"rights are guiding ideals, rather than existing entitlements," and sees the term
'right' as "a commendable or perhaps obligatory target, but not. .. a specific
obligation."19 Returning to Wolterstorff, he would not be satisfied with this
attenuated and rhetorical sense of sustenance rights, since he clearly requires
that a right be more than a promise.
A noted philosopher of rights who takes his stand on the same side of this
issue as Wolterstorff is Alan Gewirth, who argues that sustenance rights are
genuine entitlements to what purposeful agents need for action. Jan Narveson
has raised objections to Gewirth's positive rights thesis that are relevant to
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Wolterstorff as welU" Narveson charges positive rights with at least two major
defects compared to negative, noninterference rights, on the basis of which
Narveson denies that there are such sustenance rights. First, Narveson claims
that positive rights would conflict with negative rights, since fulfilling positive
rights would entail limitations on negative rights. If full negative rights were
granted, positive rights would fade away. My right to lounge unhindered on the
beach, to use Narveson's example, entails that a drowning person nearby can
have no right to my aid, although it would be no doubt good of me to help her.
Problems with negative rights aside, the positive rights thesis is secondly seen
to be fraught with a set of internal problems; in Jan Narveson's words, "of course
positive rights may give rise to conflicting duties: my duty to help the poor can
conflict with my duty to heal the sick"21 or, we may add, with that to shelter
my family, or to use an example from Wolterstorff, relieve urban blight with a
Calder statue. By contrast, a "pure theory of negative rights" would in no obvious
way give rise to such conflicts, since in language echoing Feinberg's, Narveson
observes that "in general, at least, negative rights impose duties which can be
fulfilled by doing nothing whatever. "22
Narveson's claim that the dubious positive rights would conflict with the more
firn1ly grounded negative rights is incomplete as a criticism of positive rights,
since even negative rights properly understood impose positive duties that may
conflict with one another and with those of positive rights. I will argue this
contention below.
Neuhaus's position, at least as we have reconstructed it, is dignified by much
good philosophical company. If there are sustenance rights, these would evidently
be positive and thus would require more of us than duty can demand. So to
affirm the DOS and say that failure to transfer all of our goods to the starving
is "morally tantamount to physically assaulting" the poor, as Neuhaus charges
Wolterstorff with saying, would go too far. Sustenance rights must then be given
up.
Nonetheless, I believe Wolterstorff's endorsement of sustenance rights to be
correct. I will make a number of points in his defense, and then conclude with
a move I believe is crucial to the defense of sustenance rights, the undermining
of the alleged fundamental distinction between positive and negative rights. First,
it is perhaps worth noting that Wolterstorff does not claim that the rich man's
failure is "morally tantamount" to assault; he says rather that to know of someone
who is starving, to "have the power" to alleviate this starvation, and to choose
to do nothing is to violate his sustenance rights. 21 The main point of this is to
show that alleviating poverty is not a matter of optional charity, but of respecting
human rights, and thus is obligatory. Since he never claims, and would in fact
deny, that all of morality is reducible to the fulfillment or violation of rights,
failure to provide sustenance is not necessarily morally tantamount to assault for
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him. Failure to help is as much a violation of right, but may nonetheless be
morally distinguishable from assault (e.g., it may not be accompanied by morally
objectionable attitudes that may be supposed to contribute to the moral odiousness
of assault).
Second, there may be a difference in our culpability in violating negative and
positive rights. If negative rights are primarily (although not solely) respected
by refraining from action, they largely would involve what have been called
"perfect obligations," those always in our power to fulfill, and thus involving
more blame if violated, than would failure to undertake positive, "imperfect,"
and perhaps sacrificial actions to respect sustenance rights. If I have assaulted
someone, he is clearly the victim of my violation of his right, whereas an
unspecified large number of persons are responsible when someone suffers from
starvation.
Third, Wolterstorff does have exceptions built into his requirements for fulfilling sustenance rights. In his Reformed Journal response, he claims that he has
stated
"more of them than the reader would care to hear about now. One has
to know about the starvation or aggression, one has to be able to do
something about it, one's doing something about it must not override
IJther more pressing moral obligations, and so forth."24
I think that all but the last qualification are easy to find in the book, and that
last does seem to be an important one. He perhaps meant it to be understood as
included in the qualification that the agent must "have the power" to aid. Perhaps
we can accept that "having the power" to alleviate suffering involves ability to
do so without overriding other important considerations, including keeping a
roof over one's family's heads, providing for one's children's education, keeping
ellough resources to enable one to perform one's job, supporting one's parish,
and so on. Of course, the notion of overriding needs a great deal more specification
in order to be of use, and in particular, to protect Wolterstorff's real estate
investment.
Fortunately, those who speak of duties to provide others with necessities have
found ways to avoid committing themselves to the DOS. Limiting principles
have been proposed. Alan Gewirth argues that we are obligated to provide for
the needs of others up to the point in which it involves "no comparable cost to"
our own needs for action.25 Peter Singer argues for an obligation to provide for
human need that makes reference to the principle of beneficence rather than
sustenance rights; he would have us sacrifice when necessary "to prevent something bad" up until the level when doing so would involve our "sacrificing
anything of comparable significance."26 Since the thing to which we are to
compare our sacrifice is others' lack of basic necessities, Singer would have us
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accept a milder, modified DOS. Even under his stringent requirements we need
not give "everything, all at once," as per Neuhaus's requirement, but nonetheless
Singer would have us give a great deal of what we have that keeps us above
that level of subsistence not presently enjoyed by our would-be recipients.
Wolterstorff is probably closer to Gewirth than to Singer on the extent to
which sacrifice is required. As Gewirth recognizes better than Singer, our own
lives of action, our own projects, are also worth moral consideration. This point
can be developed to help Wolterstorff avoid the DOS horn of Neuhaus's dilemma.
The positive rights advocate can insist that it is simply not the case that our one
overriding duty is always to fulfill the sustenance rights of the least fortunate.
That is an important duty, to be sure, and few of us can claim to have met our
requirements in this area. Nonetheless, our lives are more broadly to be characterized by a stewardly concern for meeting the responsibilities of the various
vocations to which we are called: parent, scholar, citizen, friend, churchperson,
etc. Fulfilling all of these legitimate callings in any sort of balanced way requires
trade-offs; I cannot do all I might do in directly aiding the hungry and still keep
the rain off of my own family and fulfill my responsibilities to my employer.
I will now turn to my major point on behalf of the sustenance-rights thesis
and against its critics, that the alleged sharp distinction between positive and
negative rights is not at all clearly delimited, and that if there are any rights at
all they must include sustenance rights as well as the more widely recognized
rights to liberty and security.
First, whatever justification can be given for so-called negative, or noninterference rights, would also establish the more controversial sustenance, or positive
rights. So, to accept noninterference rights commits one in principle to accept
sustenance rights. Philosophical accounts of rights, while varied in many respects,
generally agree on certain fundamental points. Philosophers such as Richard
Wasserstrom, Gregory Vlastos, Joel Feinberg, Thomas E. Hill Jr., E.M. Adams,
Herbert Morris, and Alan Gewirth claim that morality contains human rights
that apply equally to all persons. Persons have these rights, it is maintained,
primarily to guard their freedom, safety, and well-being. These rights are necessary to enable us to "secure, obtain, and enjoy" the goods that we need to live
a truly human life, a way of life selected by us in accord with our own values,
desires, and interests. To be able to live such a life is seen to be of extremely
great value. This is why respect for rights traditionally is seen to be closely
connected to respecting human dignity.
If rights are justified by the fact that they secure conditions necessary for
living a truly human life, what are these conditions? According to many philosophers, they are liberty, defined as freedom from hinderance as one goes about
one's business, and well-being, not having one's person or property interfered
with. But it is quite evident that no one could live a truly human life with no
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re,ources other than restraints on others' assault. Alan Gewirth includes sustenance rights with the other less controversial rights because both sustenance and
the other goods alike are necessities for what he tenns "agency," purposeful
action in the world as human beings. We can no more fulfill our purposes if we
are debilitated by starvation than if we are physically restrained. In his argument,
which is too complex to discuss here, any prospective purposeful agent must
admit as rights for others the generic requirements for action that she herself
needs for her purposeful activity, that is, freedom and well-being, including
sustenance. 27 Regardless of which specific justification is used to give philosophical grounding to rights, however, a problem appears for those who wish to
support negative rights but deny positive ones. Such philosophers paradoxically
endorse a theory of rights based on the role that rights play in securing the
ne,:essity for truly human living, while they exclude from the right-protected
goods the minimal requirements for living such a life.
fhe second point of alleged difference between the two sorts of rights I would
like to undennine is what we may call the "action-restraint distinction." This is
the widely held view that noninterference or so-called negative rights require
only that we refrain from interference with others' activities. This nicely minimal
requirement alone attaches to negative rights, while seemingly staggering duties
are borne in the train of positive rights. For this reason, Feinberg, Narveson,
and others have been led to deny any positive right to sustenance.
In his response, Wolterstorff alluded to what I take to be the answer to this
objection. When chided by Neuhaus for failing to sell his goods in fulfillment
of what we have called the DOS, Wolterstorff responded by noting that there
are other rights he accepts which he also has not gone about satisfying, e.g., he
has not joined the Afghan rebels even though he grants that they have a right
not to be victims of aggression. Wolterstorff is hinting that since all rights impose
duties of nondeprivation, protection, and aid, even so called noninterference
rights such as the right not to be assaulted impose positive duties on all. The
provision of positive duties to negative rights powerfully eviscerates the distinction between positive and negative rights. Negative rights too call for doing as
well as forbearance.
Henry Shue, in the work Basic Rights cited by Wolterstorff, helpfUlly draws
attention to the fact that "while it is possible to avoid violating someone's rights
to physical security yourself by merely refraining from acting in any of the ways
that would constitute violations ... it is impossible to protect anyone's rights to
physical security without taking, or making payments toward the taking of, a
wide range of positive actions."28 Thus, for security rights to mean anything at
all, they will require investment in "police forces; criminal courts; penitentiaries;
schools for training police, lawyers, and guards; and taxes to support an enonnous
system for the prevention, detection, and punishment of violations of personal
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security. "29 A great deal of positive action is involved in fulfilling the duties to
protect and aid others in their actual enjoyment of the security to which they are
said to have a right. An agent scarcely begins by mere nonviolation to fulfill
such a paradigmatic example of a negative or noninterference right as that to
security.
Related to this we have Feinberg's claim alluded to earlier that there can be
no sustenance rights because in practical terms, it is impossible to set up a system
that would provide effective guarantees that their claims be satisfied. There can
be no right to a minimal standard of health care, for example, because of the
impossibility of restructuring the health care delivery systems, globally and
nationally, that would be necessary to guarantee that right. I would suggest,
however, that negative rights such as that to security fare no better. We have
thus far been unable to prevent a great many assaults in our urban areas, and I
doubt that there is any practical possibility that we will do a great deal better in
the near future. Yet we do not wish to deny that no one really has security rights
merely because we are unable to safeguard them; rather we redouble our efforts
to fulfill these claims. Both security and sustenance rights call on us to take
action to forestall what Wolterstorff called "ordinary, serious, and remediable
threats"; we are not to conclude from the fact that we cannot completely satisfy
everyone's moral claims that the claims are invalid.
The action-restraint distinction can also be vitiated from the other side. Shue
argues, as do Wolterstorff and others, that so-called positive rights to sustenance
largely can be satisfied merely by restraint, by ceasing to do certain things we
now are doing which deprive the poor of their basic needs. While rights to
sustenance do involve positive duties to aid, they also involve a "type of action
needed to fulfill them ... [which] is even more difficult to distinguish sharply from
the action needed to fulfill security rights, "30 and that is to cease our own
threatening of them. In large part, sustenance rights can be satisfied by providing
people with means to self-help, or by ceasing to deprive them of such means,
as Wolterstorff recognizes. Indeed, much of Wolterstorff' s book is documentation
of how we in the global economic "core," on his theory, contribute greatly to
the poverty of others at the "periphery." Omitting from this discussion the details
of the mechanism by which the poor are denied access to what they need, let
me merely suggest that the positive right to sustenance is largely satisfied in
ways usually seen as characteristic of noninterference rights. While I do not
suppose that the sustenance rights thesis is unproblematic, I do hope to have
suggested why if there are any rights at all they will include sustenance rights,
and that no sharp positive-negative distinction by which sustenance rights are
deficient can be sustained.
An additional point: if sustenance rights are not accepted, there is a prominent
and well-known philosophical case for a positive duty to help the poor that makes
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no reference to rights at all. Peter Singer's famous argument in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" alluded to earlier derives a duty painfully close to the DOS,
in fact, from the claim that we have a duty to prevent an evil when we are
capable of doing so without sacrificing something of comparable value, and the
uncontroversial claim that suffering due to deprivation of basic needs is just such
an evil. As suggested earlier, I think that such an argument needs to be corrected
by a more fully orbed sense of our moral responsibilities as they relate to vocations
and callings, but in any case, it seems that the rights-sceptic is not yet home free.
Must Wolterstorff sell his house, on pain of being forced to give up his theory
of sustenance rights? We have said nothing that would bear on the specific level
of sacrifice he must actually endue to be faithful to his own view, but I think
that it is safe to conclude that he may limit his sacrifice by what is necessary to
fulfill such vocational responsibilities as teaching and writing books that are as
personally and intellectually challenging as the one we have been discussing.
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